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There is . . . a peculiar logical pleasure in making manifest the continuity
between what we are doing and what has been done before. But the present
has a right to govern itself so far as it can; and it ought always to be
remembered that historic continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a
necessity.
– Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1
INTRODUCTION
With this event – a Symposium on Abner Greene’s Against Obligation2 and
Michael Seidman’s On Constitutional Disobedience3 – we continue our Boston
University Law Review series of symposia on significant recent books in law.
The distinctive format is to pick two books that join issue on an important
topic, to invite the author of each book to write an essay on the other book, and
to invite several Boston University School of Law faculty members to write an
essay on one or both books.
What are the justifications for pairing Greene’s and Seidman’s books in this
series? I shall suggest three. First, as their titles indicate, the books argue
respectively against constitutional obligation and for constitutional
∗

Professor of Law, The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, and
Associate Dean for Research and Intellectual Life, Boston University School of Law. I
prepared this Essay for the Symposium on Abner Greene’s Against Obligation and Michael
Seidman’s On Constitutional Disobedience, held November 8, 2012, at Boston University
School of Law. Thanks to Courtney Gesualdi for helpful comments.
1 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Learning and Science, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 138,
139 (1920).
2 ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN A
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012).
3 LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (2012).
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disobedience: they provocatively and creatively buck the tendencies of
constitutional theorists to profess fidelity with the past in constitutional
interpretation. Second, for this reason, these books are a worthy sequel to last
year’s symposium on Jack Balkin’s Living Originalism and David Strauss’s
The Living Constitution.4 Both books reject originalist understandings of
obligation to follow original meaning in interpreting the Constitution, even of
the sort associated with Balkin’s abstract living originalism (which aspires to
fidelity to the abstract commitments of, rather than the concrete expectations
of, the founding generation).5 And indeed both reject interpretive obligation to
follow precedent, even of the type illustrated by Strauss’s flexible living
constitutionalism.6 Greene and Seidman provide powerful arguments against
views that original meaning and precedent are dispositive of constitutional
meaning and decision. Each argues that we the people today should decide
questions of constitutional meaning, commitment, and justice for ourselves, by
our own best lights.
Third, while Greene’s and Seidman’s books share these similarities, they
have illuminating differences. The most striking difference relates to their
attitudes toward the dualist structure of our constitutional system: the two
tracks of (1) the fundamental law of the Constitution and (2) the ordinary law
of legislation. I do not interpret Greene as wishing to do away with the
fundamental law or to “level” it to ordinary law, whereas I do interpret
Seidman as aiming to do so. Rather, Greene aims to preserve the dualist
structure and to elaborate the meaning of the fundamental law by giving
primacy to normative argument over any obligation to follow the past.7 By
contrast, Seidman wants to “level” the fundamental law of the Constitution and
just have discourse about what ordinary laws we ought to adopt.8 He advocates
that we should simply make all-things-considered judgments about the best
thing to do.9 As he titled an op-ed piece in the New York Times: “Let’s [g]ive
up on the Constitution.”10
In this Essay I focus on Greene’s arguments against interpretive obligation
to the past, in particular, his argument that even constitutional theorists like
Ronald Dworkin and I give too much deference or weight to “fit” and
precedent, and not enough primacy to “justification” and justice, in our
approaches to constitutional interpretation.11 I should begin by observing that
4

Originalism and Living Constitutionalism: A Symposium on Jack Balkin’s Living
Originalism and David Strauss’s The Living Constitution, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1127 (2012).
5 JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
6 DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).
7 See GREENE, supra note 2, at 201-04.
8 See SEIDMAN, supra note 3, at 9.
9 See id. at 26, 115, 129.
10 Louis Michael Seidman, Op-Ed., Let’s Give Up on the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
31, 2012, at A19.
11 GREENE, supra note 2, at 169-71, 192-97, 201-04 (criticizing RONALD DWORKIN,
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both Greene and I are, broadly speaking, Dworkinians, or moral readers. By
that I mean that we conceive the Constitution in significant part as a scheme of
abstract moral commitments, not a code of concrete historical rules. And we
conceive interpretation of the Constitution as requiring judgments about what
interpretation best “fits” and “justifies” the constitutional document, order, and
practice. Interpretation is not a matter of discovering and enforcing historically
determined answers provided by the framers and ratifiers (whether original
intentions, understandings, or public meanings).
Hence, it is no surprise that I largely agree with Greene’s account of the
place of fit and justification in constitutional interpretation. And so, in what
follows, it may seem like we are having a heated agreement. Even where we
disagree, it may seem that we are having a family quarrel. But I do think the
engagement is worthwhile, for it provides an occasion for me to clarify and
sharpen my own arguments about fit, justification, and fidelity in constitutional
interpretation. This Essay is part of my book in progress entitled Fidelity to
Our Imperfect Constitution.12 This book will criticize all forms of originalism
and it will further develop my arguments in previous books for a “philosophic
approach” to constitutional interpretation13 and for a “Constitution-perfecting
theory” that would interpret the Constitution so as to make it the best it can
be.14
I.

AGAINST INTERPRETIVE OBLIGATION TO FOLLOW THE PAST

Again, Greene argues against interpretative obligation to the past, whether
to concrete original meaning or precedents (as he puts it, whether to “higher”
or “prior” authorities).15 He makes cogent arguments against originalism as
conventionally understood. His arguments zero in on originalists’ assumptions
or claims that we are obligated to follow the original understanding or original
meaning, concretely conceived as the original expected applications of the
framers and ratifiers. His arguments also target originalists’ aims or claims to
avoid making moral and philosophic choices in constitutional interpretation.
Such choices, he rightly argues, are inevitable and indeed desirable. In a
nutshell, he shows that originalists unsuccessfully attempt to stress fit to the
exclusion of justification.16

LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE
CASE OF AUTONOMY (2006)); Abner S. Greene, The Fit Dimension, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
2921, 2926-48 (2007).
12 JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION (forthcoming) (on file
with author).
13 SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE
BASIC QUESTIONS 82-84, 97-98, 155-70 (2007).
14 FLEMING, supra note 11, at 16, 211, 225, 227.
15 GREENE, supra note 2, at 161-63.
16 Id. at 161, 165-66, 172-81.
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At the same time, Greene criticizes moral readers like Dworkin and me for
conceiving constitutional interpretation as being too constrained by fit – in
particular, by interpretive obligation to follow precedents.17 It seems that, to
Greene, Dworkin and I do not fully acknowledge the primacy of justification
over fit. I should say emphatically that I welcome this criticism! Moral readers
like Dworkin and me are usually criticized for giving too little room for fit, and
too much primacy to justification.18 Since we are being criticized from both
sides, I guess we must be doing something right!
To elaborate, I shall sketch the predicament of moral readers like Dworkin
and me. In general, no one doubts our commitment to the normative dimension
of justification in constitutional interpretation. After all, we argue that
constitutional interpretation is a matter of making moral and philosophical
judgments about the meanings and implications of our constitutional
commitments. The challenge we face is to show that we are not just
elaborating our own liberal commitments for a perfect liberal Constitution.19
We make three basic responses to these “perfect Constitution” challenges.
First, we argue that it is in the nature of constitutional interpretation to strive to
interpret the Constitution so as to make it the best it can be.20 Second, we show
that we do not believe that the Constitution, even when construed in its best
light, is perfect. For example, Dworkin concedes that the Constitution does not
protect welfare rights (rights which his ideal liberal Constitution would
protect).21 And I have acknowledged all manner of constitutional evil,
misfortune, stupidity, and tragedy in our constitutional practice.22 Third, we
argue that our liberal constitutional theories fit the constitutional document and
scheme. They have a firm footing in our extant constitutional practice and they
are not just normative theories that would justify a perfect liberal
Constitution.23
Enter my first book, Securing Constitutional Democracy, which Greene
criticizes for giving primacy to fit over justification.24 Officially, Dworkin’s
moral reading aspires to construct a theory that best fits and justifies our
constitutional document, order, and practice.25 Yet many critics believe that

17 Id. at 169-70, 192-97, 201-04 (criticizing DWORKIN, supra note 11; FLEMING, supra
note 11).
18 E.g., Anthony J. Sebok, The Insatiable Constitution, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 417, 419-20
(1997).
19 See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 364
(1981).
20 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 38 (1996); DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 255.
21 DWORKIN, supra note 20, at 36.
22 FLEMING, supra note 11, at 220-21.
23 Id. at 63, 70, 80-81, 92-98.
24 GREENE, supra note 2, at 169-71, 192-97, 201-04; Greene, supra note 11, at 2926-48.
25 See DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 239.
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Dworkin (to use Greene’s terms) has given “primacy to justification”26 and not
enough “room for fit.”27 They claim that he has elaborated a perfect liberal
constitution but has not done the concrete groundwork necessary to show that
his interpretations of the Constitution adequately fit our practice, including
original meaning and precedents.28 In response, I basically say, “Do as
Dworkin says, not as he does.”29 That is, even if Dworkin himself may not
always satisfactorily do the fit work that his own theory calls for, I do take fit
seriously in my book. I seek to remedy the deficiency of Dworkin’s work by
making the fit case for a liberal theory of “securing constitutional democracy”
that protects not only basic procedural liberties associated with deliberative
democracy, like the right to vote, but also basic substantive liberties associated
with what I called deliberative autonomy, like the right to marry. Instead of
simply making a normative argument that justice requires protecting a right to
individual autonomy, I undertake an archeological excavation of the legal
materials of our constitutional practice and culture, specifically the line of
substantive due process cases protecting certain basic liberties associated with
privacy or autonomy.30 I ask: what constitutional theory would best fit and
justify these cases? I argue that my “constitutional constructivism” better fits
and justifies these cases than do competing theories of originalism (Justice
Scalia’s view) or perfecting the processes of representative democracy or
deliberative democracy (Ely’s and Sunstein’s views).31 Yet my taking this “fit”
tack – doing as Dworkin says, not as he does – is evidently what has prompted
Greene’s criticism that I give too much deference to fit and precedent and fail
to give “primacy [to] justification.”32
I make three arguments in this Essay. First, I argue that a commitment to fit
(like that in my book, Securing Constitutional Democracy) does not necessitate
commitment to the view that one has an interpretive obligation to follow the
past – whether concrete original meaning or precedents. In short, taking fit
seriously ≠ interpretive obligation to follow the past. Nevertheless, fit may
figure prominently in a sound account of the aspiration to fidelity in
interpreting the Constitution.
Second, I argue that interpreters who aspire to fidelity in constitutional
interpretation have a responsibility to construct an account that not only
justifies but also fits our constitutional document, order, and practice. But the
aspiration to fidelity itself does not entail an interpretive obligation to follow
26

GREENE, supra note 2, at 12, 201.
Id. at 204; Greene, supra note 11, at 2947.
28 Greene, supra note 11, at 2938.
29 James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1335,
1349 (1997).
30 FLEMING, supra note 11, at 92-98.
31 Id. at 97-98 (criticizing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993)).
32 GREENE, supra note 2, at 12.
27
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the past. In short, taking fidelity seriously ≠ interpretive obligation to the past.
In this section I will comment in more detail on fidelity without obligation and
without originalism, sketching the account of fidelity in pursuit of our
aspirations that I am developing in my book in progress, Fidelity to Our
Imperfect Constitution.
Third, I argue that fit and justification are co-original and of equal weight,
instead of justification having “primacy” over while also leaving “room for
fit.” Here I shall say more about fit in relation to justification and fidelity in
constitutional interpretation.
II.

TAKING FIT SERIOUSLY ≠ INTERPRETIVE OBLIGATION TO FOLLOW THE
PAST

Does my commitment to taking fit as well as justification seriously entail a
commitment to interpretive obligation to follow the past, whether concrete
original meaning or precedent? In making the “fit” case for my theory, I
present precedents in the line of substantive due process decisions as bones or
shards of a constitutional culture, as provisional fixed points that a
constitutional constructivist archaeologist, or interpreter, has a responsibility to
fit and justify.33 I argue that a constructivist interpreter would not be free to
cast out the substantive shards and bones in the way that an originalist or
process-perfecter would.34 This is not to say that judges, much less citizens,
have an obligation to follow the past. Rather, it is to say that our pictures of our
constitutional practice will be more recognizable – and be better accounts – if
we can work up an account that fits and justifies the durable lines of doctrine.
I do not offer a theory of precedent or stare decisis as such, nor do I justify
following precedent for any of the reasons people commonly offer to justify
this practice – reasons that Greene considers and rejects as inadequate.35 As a
matter of fact, I do not believe that anyone has a strong sense of obligation to
follow precedent as such in constitutional interpretation.
Fidelity to our imperfect Constitution, I would argue – and thanks to Greene
I now see this more clearly – entails rejecting any obligation to follow original
meaning or precedent. As I have argued elsewhere, if our Constitution were
conceived merely as consisting of original expected applications or precedents,
it would not deserve our fidelity.36 The Constitution, to be worthy of our
fidelity, must reflect our aspirations to realize the ends proclaimed in the
Preamble. For the Constitution to do that, we must reject any idea of an
obligation to follow original expected applications or precedents as such.
Fidelity to our imperfect Constitution entails fidelity in pursuit of our
constitutional aspirations and ends.

33
34
35
36

FLEMING, supra note 11, at 93.
Id. at 94.
GREENE, supra note 2, at 190-99.
FLEMING, supra note 11, at 226-27.
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What is more, I do not see fit as I practice it as imposing an obligation to
follow the past in a way that Greene would find objectionable. The dimension
of fit basically does two things. First, it screens out purely utopian
interpretations that have no claim on us by insisting upon showing the footing
of the interpretation in our constitutional practice. Hence, even if we are
constructing a moral reading – and even if we are giving primacy to
justification – we give room for fit to show that the interpretation is an
interpretation of our constitutional practice, not that of a perfectly just
Constitution. Second, fit screens out off-the-wall interpretations (which are not
necessarily utopian). Indeed, fit indicates that the proffered interpretation has a
footing in our practice.
Furthermore, if one conceives constitutional interpretation and justification
as constructivist, as I do, one sees our principles as manifested in and growing
out of our constitutional commitments and practice, not abstract ideas of what
justice requires.37 Within constructivism, one sees the dimension of fit as
bound up with the dimension of justification: we are trying to work up the best
justification for the extant materials of the constitutional practice.
In response to Greene’s argument that Dworkin and I give too much
deference or weight to precedent, I should clarify my views about the place of
precedent in constitutional interpretation. I would say that, if one thinks of
precedents as good-faith efforts to work out the best understanding of our
constitutional commitments, one should give them some weight and approach
them with some humility. I hasten to add that, to accept this approach, one
need not and should not go whole hog to Burkeanism. Greene aptly criticizes
Burkean justifications for following precedent as such.38 One need not give
precedents presumptive weight or “deference,” to use Greene’s formulations.39
Ironically, moral readers and common law constitutionalists may give more
weight to precedent than do originalists. For one thing, originalists officially
give greater weight to concrete original meaning and are dubious about
precedents they see as inconsistent with concrete original meaning.40 Indeed,
some originalists, like Gary Lawson, reject precedent altogether.41 Others, like
Justice Scalia, make a “pragmatic exception” to originalism to accommodate
precedent.42 By contrast, moral readers and living constitutionalists (more
precisely, common law constitutionalists) conceive the Constitution as a frame
of government and scheme of abstract powers and rights, the meaning of which
37

Id. at 6, 62, 66, 92-94.
GREENE, supra note 2, at 194-95.
39 Id. at 192-93, 197-98.
40 BALKIN, supra note 5, at 14.
41 Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE
MARIA L. REV. 1, 4 (2007); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 24 (1994).
42 Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 129, 140 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
38
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must be elaborated over time. They deny that the framers and ratifiers resolved
our problems for us. Accordingly, they may give greater weight to interpreters’
good-faith efforts to work out the frame or scheme over time. I say “ironically”
because living constitutionalists always emphasize flexibility and change, and
argue against being tied down by the past. Yet they may be more tied down by
precedent than originalists are. This is so in part because they conceive of
precedents as part of the constitutional practice that we are trying to carry on in
a principled, coherent way.
In my observation, though, no one, or hardly anyone, believes that we have
a strong obligation to follow precedents as such. And this is as it should be. At
any given time, a body of law will be riven by competing substantive ideals
and competing approaches to interpretation. Proponents and opponents of a
given view will win some cases and lose others. The conflicting views are
embodied in the cases as they develop. And so, one cannot operate under a
strong obligation to follow precedents as such and still make defensible
decisions.
Furthermore, as Sotirios Barber and I have argued, we cannot make recourse
to precedent to avoid making moral and philosophic choices in constitutional
interpretation.43 Instead, we use precedent and argument concerning its
implications as a site on which to do battle over and choose among competing
views. Thus, precedent is a site or battleground for making moral and
philosophic choices. The precedents themselves do not settle the questions and
make the choices for us.
I do not consider it a weakness of precedent that people are willing to
disregard it when they believe a previous case was wrongly decided, instead of
adhere to it. Or, more likely, they argue that the precedent in its implications
supports what they think is the best interpretation and the best moral and
philosophic choice in the case before them. That is the strength of precedent!
We argue about and from precedents, not because we have an obligation to
follow them or because they decide our cases for us; instead, we do so to
elaborate the meaning and best understanding of our constitutional
commitments. We ask whether the precedent was rightly decided because we
are striving to make our constitutional commitments the best they can be.
Precedents inform our judgment and they provide evidence of the best
understanding of our commitments, but they do not themselves make those
judgments for us. We have to make those judgments ourselves: that is why we
cannot and do not simply stand as decided.
III. TAKING FIDELITY SERIOUSLY ≠ INTERPRETIVE OBLIGATION TO THE PAST
In articles that are part of my book in progress, Fidelity to Our Imperfect
Constitution, I argue that, if we aspire to fidelity to the Constitution, a moral
reading is superior to originalism (at least all varieties of originalism besides

43

BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 13, at 135-40, 190.
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Balkin’s abstract living originalism, which I interpret as a moral reading).44
The aspiration to fidelity
raises two fundamental questions: Fidelity to what? and What is fidelity?
The short answer to the first – fidelity to the Constitution – poses a
further question: What is the Constitution? For example, does the
Fourteenth Amendment embody abstract moral principles or enact
relatively concrete historical rules? . . . The short answer to the second –
being faithful to the Constitution in interpreting it – leads to another
question: How should the Constitution be interpreted? Does faithfulness
to the Fourteenth Amendment require recourse to political theory to
elaborate general moral concepts or prohibit it and instead require
historical research to discover relatively specific original understanding or
meaning? And does the quest for fidelity in interpreting the Constitution
exhort us to make it the best it can be or forbid us to do so in favor of
enforcing an imperfect Constitution?45
Let’s begin with the question, Fidelity to what? My answer is fidelity to our
abstract constitutional aspirations, including ends, principles, and basic
liberties. Fidelity to our aspirations does not entail obligation to follow the past
in the sense of either concrete original meaning or precedents. That would
enshrine an imperfect Constitution that falls short of our aspirations and does
not deserve our fidelity. We should treat precedents as evidence, factors, or
resources, but not as obligations. They are to be taken into account, but
followed only to the extent that they accord with our best understanding of our
aspirations.
Next, let’s consider the other question, What is fidelity? It is not fealty, or
subservience. It is not following the authority of the past in the manner of an
authoritarian originalism. Furthermore, it is not obligation to the concrete past,
whether original meaning or precedents. Rather, fidelity is honoring our
aspirations and pursuing our commitments by furthering our best
understandings of them. The concrete original meaning and precedents are
evidence of good-faith efforts to pursue those aspirations, but they are not the
aspirations themselves. They have no doubt fallen short of our aspirations. If
following those sources from the past dishonors our aspirations and
undermines our commitments, we have good reasons to reject them in order to
pursue our aspirations and commitments.
Moreover – to return to the question, Fidelity to what? – we should aspire to
fidelity to our scheme as an ongoing frame of government pursuing the ends of
the Preamble, not as a set of concrete original meanings or a string of

44

James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1785,
1798-99 (2013); James E. Fleming, Living Originalism and Living Constitutionalism as
Moral Readings of the American Constitution, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1175-77 (2012);
James E. Fleming, The Balkinization of Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 669, 675-79.
45 Fleming, supra note 29, at 1335.
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precedents. Again, I do not say that we have an obligation to follow the
concrete past, though I do say that we aspire to fidelity to the Constitution.
How can we honor fidelity while rejecting obligation to the concrete past?
If we conceive the Constitution as a frame of government, to be lived under
and worked out over time, we can approach it with an attitude of fidelity but
without an obligation of obedience to concrete expected applications or
precedents. Fidelity on this understanding entails a commitment to making the
frame of government work, to learning from experience, and to interpreting the
Constitution so as to further its ends and realize its aspirations.
Fidelity? Yes. Commitment? Yes. Obligation or obedience in an
authoritarian sense to original expected applications or precedents? No.
Fidelity is not obedience to decisions already made for us in the past by people
who are long dead and who were ignorant of the challenges and problems of
our age. Fidelity, rather, is an attitude of commitment to making the scheme
work and to further developing it, building it out over time, as Balkin puts it,46
in ways to better realize its ends and our aspirations. Or, as Dworkin and I put
it, to making the Constitution the best it can be.47
IV. FIT AND JUSTIFICATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Finally, I shall assess Greene’s formulations about the “primacy of
justification” and “room for fit.” Greene argues against interpretive obligation
to follow the past, but he allows “room for fit.”48 He acknowledges that in
particular cases there can be good reasons for following past decisions. As
Balkin puts it, evidence of concrete original meanings and precedents serve as
a resource, not a constraint, in constitutional interpretation.49 Similarly, Greene
says that they serve as a factor, not an obligation.50
I agree completely with Greene’s conception of “room for fit.”51 Yet he says
that people like Dworkin and me want to treat fit as more than a factor.52
Greene conceives of a presumption of deference as lying on the terrain
between fit being a factor and fit being an obligation, and situates Dworkin and
me at that point. I think that Dworkin and I give similar room for fit, and we
similarly treat fit as a factor though not an obligation. If I appear to treat fit as
more than a factor, I suspect that it is simply because I have attempted to
provide a corrective to Dworkin’s work – to do as he says, not as he does. I
suspect that most readers outside our family quarrel would argue that Dworkin

46
47
48
49
50
51
52

BALKIN, supra note 5, at 5.
DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 255; FLEMING, supra note 11, at 16, 211, 225, 227.
GREENE, supra note 2, at 201-06.
BALKIN, supra note 5, at 256-59.
GREENE, supra note 2, at 192, 197, 206.
Id. at 204-06.
Id. at 192-93, 196-97.
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and I, like Greene, do give primacy to justification over fit (or indeed that we
give too little room for fit).
I would resist framing the issue in terms of whether fit or justification has
primacy. Both dimensions enter into interpretation, and they are intertwined.
There is no raw or bare fit that is prior to or apart from justification, nor is
there any justification divorced from fit that has any purchase on us.
What is more, I do not believe that Greene has made the case for the
primacy of justification over fit. He has, admittedly, made the case for the
unavoidability of justification as well as fit, and the inextricable connection
between them. I would argue instead that fit and justification are co-original
and of equal weight.53 Both are inherently involved in constitutional
interpretation. Both stem from the basic aim of developing the best
interpretation.
In places, Dworkin almost seems to regret drawing the distinction between
the two dimensions of fit and justification.54 Doing so is important for
analytical clarity, but it may lead people to see the two dimensions as more
distinct than they are, as if they correspond to a two-step process. And it may
lead them to view the two dimensions as sequential rather than as dimensions
of a holistic judgment: as in, first we fit and then we justify.55 And it may lead
them to argue that one or the other is primary. For example, they might argue
that fit is everything, to the exclusion of justification.56 Or, even if fit is not
everything, that fit has primacy over justification. Or, to the contrary, that
justification has primacy over fit. This is what Greene argues.57
In Securing Constitutional Democracy, I spoke of the best interpretation as
that which provides the best fit with and justification of the constitutional
document, order, and practice.58 Thus, I purposely avoided splitting up these
two dimensions. Having said that, I should acknowledge that I do make a fit
case for my theory of securing constitutional democracy. But I hasten to add
that, at the same time, I make the case that my theory justifies our
constitutional document, order, and practice.
In writing the book, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions with
Sotirios Barber, I initially wanted to refer to the two dimensions of fit and
justification, but Barber insisted that we avoid this distinction. For him,

53 Cf. FLEMING, supra note 11, at 78 (applying the idea “‘co-original and of equal
weight’” in an analogous context (quoting John Rawls, Reply to Habermas, 92 J. PHIL. 132,
163 (1995)).
54 DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 65-66.
55 E.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 551, 553-54
(2010).
56 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A
Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1269, 1292 (1997).
57 GREENE, supra note 2, at 201-04.
58 FLEMING, supra note 11, at 5, 63, 84, 92-93, 97-98.

1294

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1283

interpretation is just a matter of giving the best account of honoring
constitutional commitments and furthering constitutional ends. I have come to
see the wisdom of this view of fit and justification as inextricably bound
together in the idea of giving the best account.
At the same time, I should emphasize that there is analytical power and
clarity in distinguishing fit and justification and acknowledge that I myself
have distinguished the two in my own work.59 As against those who argue that
“fit is everything,” I have argued that fit alone is insufficient to resolve the
clash between competing interpretations in hard cases. We have to resort to
justification to do so. As stated above, my taking fit seriously shows that my
moral readings have a firm footing in our constitutional practice. Furthermore,
fit enables people to see their aspirations in the Constitution. Finally, fit
enables us to criticize others’ views as revisionist, radical, or subversive. For
example, I can criticize the Tea Party as revisionist, radical, and subversive
because they cannot even fit much of our twenty-first century constitutional
practice. To be sure, I can also criticize them on normative grounds of
justification: they have a deficient, unjust normative theory, one moreover that
falls short of or misses the mark on our aspirations in the Preamble to the
Constitution.
These uses of fit show the analytical power, in certain contexts, of stressing
fit. But that is not to say that, even here, fit is entirely distinct from
justification. To recall Greene’s formulation, I would say that, in these ways,
fit is a factor in constitutional interpretation.60 In my book, I shall say more
about how fit factors in constitutional interpretation – even perfectionist
interpretation that aspires to interpret the Constitution so as to make it the best
it can be and worthy of our fidelity.
I doubt that Greene would object to what I have said here about fit and
justification. To recapitulate: if I seem to give primacy to fit over justification,
it is because I strive to show that my theory – though a Constitution-perfecting
theory – is a theory of our constitutional order, not one of a perfect liberal
Constitution. Like Greene, I view fit with original meaning and precedent as a
resource for deciding constitutional meaning, as a factor in making
constitutional decisions, and as evidence of the content of our commitments
and indeed of political justice. Even though interpreters do not have an
obligation to follow the past, they may be more effective in persuading people
that their interpretations are faithful to the Constitution’s aspirations if they can
make an argument that their interpretation both fits with and justifies the
constitutional document, underlying constitutional order, and evolved
constitutional practice.
Finally, I would like to make an observation concerning Seidman’s evident
view related to fit and justification. If Greene would give primacy to
justification over fit, it seems that Seidman would throw out fit altogether and
59
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the Constitution along with it.61 Evidently that would leave only normative
argument about the best thing to do. It is not clear to me that normative
arguments without regard to fit with the extant constitutional document,
doctrine, and practice will be superior to our current forms of argument.
Normative arguments tend to be more persuasive to people when they are cast
in terms of realizing our commitments and aspirations than when they are cast
simply as arguments for an ideal state of affairs. Similarly, I believe that, to a
greater degree than is commonly appreciated, normative argument, at least in
our political and constitutional culture, is more constructivist than utopian. It
articulates the ideals implicit in our practices. Seidman might say this is a bad
thing – that it shows the degree to which the Constitution has constricted our
thinking about justice and other good things. But I believe that our thinking
about justice is enriched through constructivism, as compared with what it
would be like if we did away with the Constitution or simply asked ourselves
what justice requires as a utopian matter.62 Constitutional arguments that fit
and justify our constitutional document and practice exert a greater claim on
people than do utopian arguments, for the former are arguments about the best
understanding of our practices, commitments, and aspirations.
But this is not to say that in keeping the Constitution, instead of doing away
with it, we are saying we have an interpretive obligation to follow the past.
Similarly, we are not engaging in constitutional disobedience if we reject
concrete original meaning or precedents. To the contrary, I would argue that by
doing so we are pursuing constitutional fidelity.
In the passage quoted in the epigraph with which I began this Essay, Holmes
famously wrote that “historic continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a
necessity.”63 I suppose that Holmes meant that somehow there is no avoiding
following the past. I do not endorse Holmes’s evidently deterministic view. I,
like Greene, would agree with Holmes that following the past is not a duty.
Unlike Holmes, however, I would say that it is a necessity in the weaker sense
that, to be persuasive in our constitutional culture, one generally needs to argue
that one’s interpretations fit with the past, show the past in its best light (as
Dworkin and I put it), or redeem the promises of our abstract moral
commitments and aspirations (as Balkin puts it).64 This is not originalism. It is
a moral reading that aspires to fidelity to our imperfect Constitution.
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